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1. Introduction 
Observing how a firm adjusts wages and employment in response to a large 
shock can yield important insights about the nature of adjustment processes in labor 
markets. We analyze a rich personnel data set from a Russian firm for a period (1997 
to 2002) that spans the Russian financial crisis in 1998, in order to shed light on 
crucial but largely unresolved questions about the functioning of labor markets in 
general. We analyze how the firm adjusts wages and employment during this period 
and compare the firm’s behavior to the theoretical predictions arising from alternative 
models of wage and employment determination. 
For example, do firms adapt their wage policy to changes in labor market 
conditions? And if so, are all workers affected in the same way, or are incumbent 
workers shielded from external labor market shocks as early theoretical work on 
internal labor markets suggests (see Doeringer and Piore 1971)?1 We investigate how 
the firm adjusts wages in response to the crisis and study whether all workers are 
affected in the same way. Although several studies have explored to what extent 
internal labor markets cushion incumbent workers from external labor market shocks 
♣ Corresponding author: hartmut.lehmann@unibo.it. 
1 Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 2) argue that workers in jobs that are filled by promotion or transfer 
from within are “shielded from the direct influence of competitive forces in the external market”, but 
that the internal and external labor markets are connected at the ports of entry. 
                                                 
(e.g., Baker, Gbbs, and Holmstrom 1994; Lazear 1999; Lazear and Oyer 2004), it is 
still not well understood how workers’ welfare is affected by firm performance over 
the business cycle.2 There is evidence that the conditions at the time of hiring have a 
persistent impact on future wages (see, e.g., von Wachter and Bender 2006). The 
picture that has emerged in the empirical literature so far, i.e., that hiring wages track 
industry wages, and that differences in hiring wages are persistent, suggests that 
market-induced variations in marginal productivity are not fully reflected in wages of 
incumbent workers. However, it has been difficult so far to establish a direct link 
between shocks to (external) labor market conditions and changes of firms’ personnel 
policies, potentially because shocks are typically rather small. For this reason, 
assessing how firms react to large macroeconomic shocks such as the financial crisis 
that occurred in Russia in 1998 is potentially very informative. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces the firm under study and describes the personnel data set, while section 3 
gives a brief account of how it fared during the financial crisis and in its aftermath as 
well as how the local labor market was affected by the crisis. Section 4 discusses the 
choice of the appropriate model of wage and employment determination consistent 
with the observed large fall in the average real wage after the crisis, large fall in 
separations from the firm and steady increase in the firm’s employment in the years 
1997 to 2002. In particular, we consider the competitive, internal labor market, 
monopsony and efficiency wage models.3 Section 5 then establishes some robust 
evidence about the evolution of wages, employment and turnover in the firm over the 
2 If firms adjust to accumulated shocks, for example because they face fixed adjustment costs 
(Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996), it is difficult to identify a close link between single shocks and wage or 
employment adjustments. 
3 We do not look at models of collective bargaining since in our firm trade union representatives have 
no influence on wage policy, and wages are set unilaterally by top management. In discussions with the 
firm’s human resources manager it transpired that trade unions do not play a role in wage 
determination.  
                                                 
period that encompasses the financial crisis. We also discuss the local labor market 
conditions before and after the crisis. We then link our findings to the preferred model 
of wage and employment determination discussed in section 4. A final section 
concludes. 
 
2. The personnel dataset  
Our personnel dataset is an unbalanced year-end panel data set for the years 
1997 to 2002 constructed using employee records from the personnel archive of a 
firm that is located in a provincial city in Russia. The firm operates in the “machine 
building and metal working” (MBMW) sector, according to the classification of 
industrial activity used in Russia at the time. The firm was founded in the early fifties 
of the last century and was privatized in 1992. In 2002, more than half of the shares 
were owned by managers and workers, about twenty percent by former employees 
and roughly a quarter by other Russian entities.4 Following the conversion of 
production lines inherited from Soviet times, it produces well equipment for gas and 
oil production and smith-press equipment.5 More than ninety percent of its production 
is destined for the Russian market. It has no local competitors, but nationally it has to 
compete with more than 5 firms, among them importers from the European Union. 
Our firm is not representative of the MBMW sector or Russian industry at 
large. In the period under analysis (1997-2002), many privatized large firms in the 
4 It is noteworthy that this ownership structure, with a large component of shares held by current and 
former employees, had no practical impact on wage and employment policies in our firm. From 
published annual financial statements we know that employees with shares have no voting rights and 
that the CEO and a few leading managers have a large enough block of voting shares to dominate all 
aspects of firm decision-making, including wage and employment policies. In principle, large dividend 
payments, paid to a subset of employees and varying over time, could cause differential wage payments 
across the workforce. However, from the same published statements of the firm we know that annual 
dividend payments to employees are miniscule relative to annual total compensation. In essence, 
corporate governance structures in this firm neither give employees some direct influence over the 
wage setting process nor are they important for the levels and the differentiation of wages. 
5 Source: Interview with the director general of the firm in the spring of 2002.  
                                                 
sector and in Russian industry generally were shedding labor (Kapeliushnikov 2002), 
but the workforce in our firm was fairly steady and slightly increasing between 1997 
and 2002. Rather, our firm is a member of the numerically small but economically 
important group of industrial firms that managed the transition to a market-based 
economy well.6  
We have records of all employees who were employed at any time during this 
period, except for top managers whose information is not disclosed for reasons of 
confidentiality. The data contain information on individuals’ demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, marital status and number of children, on their 
educational attainment, retraining and other skill enhancement activities before 
joining the firm and during tenure at the firm. We also know the exact date when each 
employee started work at the firm. In addition we can distinguish between full-time 
and part-time employees.  
In Russian industrial firms the workforce is typically divided into five 
employee categories: administration (i.e. management) which we label “managers”; 
accounting and financial specialists whom we label “accountants”; engineering and 
technical specialists (including programmers) whom we subsume under the term 
“engineers”; primary and auxiliary production workers, whom we label “production 
workers”; and finally, service staff.7  
For the years 1997 to 2002 we have monthly wages averaged over the year. 
Wages are reported by the firm as the employee's average monthly wage in rubles for 
the year (or fraction of the year, if not employed for the full 12 months), with no 
adjustment for inflation. The inflation rate in Russia during this period was irregular 
6 The CEO of our firm is considered one of the most successful managers in Russian industry: he was 
ranked among the top 35 managers in the machine building sector by Kommersant (2006), the leading 
business magazine in Russia. 
7 Only production workers are subdivided into levels, primary production workers having eight and 
auxiliary production workers having six levels. 
                                                 
and sometimes quite high – the price level more than doubled between the start of the 
financial crisis in July 1998 and April 1999, and was 0-2% per month before and after 
– and so some care is required to construct appropriate deflators. Because the nominal 
average monthly wage is an average for the year, it is deflated into 1997 constant 
rubles using an annual average CPI, i.e., the average price level for the year relative to 
the average price level in 1997.8  
 
3. The impact of the financial crisis on the firm and its local labor market  
In November 1997 and during 1998 the Russian economy was confronted with 
two speculative attacks on the ruble. While the Central Bank of Russia was able to 
successfully defend the ruble in the first episode, in August 1998 a financial 
meltdown occurred and on August 17, 1998 the Russian government devalued the 
ruble, defaulted on domestic debt, and declared a 90 days moratorium on payment to 
foreign creditors.9 The financial crisis had severe short-term consequences, leading to 
an upsurge of inflation, a collapse of a large part of the private banking sector and a 
virtual stop of economic activities for some weeks. After this period, however, rising 
8 We have available monthly data on CPI inflation in Russia overall and in the oblast (region) where 
the firm is located (Rosstat, various years). In this paper we work primarily with monthly wages 
averaged over the year, and so we compare average annual inflation rates in the oblast with national 
rates. This comparison shows that inflation (in percent) in the oblast is very similar to national 
inflation:  
 
                  Russia     Oblast  
1997          15.4          14.0  
1998          38.1          38.7  
1999          98.6          97.9  
2000          20.8          20.4  
2001          21.6          19.1  
2002          16.0          14.5  
 
These indices are based on average monthly price levels calculated using monthly inflation rates. Over 
the entire period of 1997 to 2002, the cumulative price indices diverge by less than 3 percent. 
Consequently, results using wages and bonuses deflated by the national CPI are virtually identical to 
those using the oblast CPI. We use the national CPI in what follows. 
9 For lucid discussions of the Russian financial meltdown, see Chiodo and Owyang (2002) and Kharas, 
Pinto, and Ulatov (2001), as well as the comments by Summers and Williamson (2001) on the latter 
paper. 
                                                 
oil prices, a real depreciation of the ruble and a large fall in real wages set the Russian 
economy on a growth path, which continued until the world financial crisis in 2008. A 
key reason why the collapse of the private banking sector had little effect on the real 
economy after the meltdown in 1998 had to do with the fact that private banks pre-
crisis operated mainly in the stock and bond markets and provided little lending 
capital to enterprises (see, e.g., Desai 2000). In the run-up to and during the crisis, 
probably only few firms suffered from decreased access to capital. Rather, the impact 
of the crisis on firms was felt via the temporary standstill in economic activity, 
reduction in demand for the products of most firms and collapse in confidence of 
consumers and producers.  
Unlike Russian industry at large, our particular firm weathered the financial 
crisis well. Before the crisis, demand for the firm’s products was only very briefly hit 
by the drop in oil production that was sparked by a sharp drop in oil prices and the 
real appreciation of the ruble which made it difficult for the firm to compete with 
importers.10 Due to the devaluation of the ruble on August 17, and a rising oil price, 
demand for oil drilling equipment very rapidly recovered. In essence, the firm had a 
constant inflow of orders starting towards the end of 1996, which was not interrupted 
in a substantial fashion by the crisis. As a result, the size of the workforce was rather 
stable during the period of analysis. Table 1 shows that the number of full-time 
employees on a full-week schedule fluctuated only slightly around approximately 
2,900 persons in all years, with a slight increase at the end of the period, and the 
composition of the workforce hardly changed throughout the period. There is a small 
increase in the share of production workers compensated by negligible falls in the 
shares of engineers and accountants. 
10 From the interview with the firm’s director general it is clear that the shortage of lending capital in 
the immediate aftermath of the crisis was less relevant for this firm than the drop in oil production and 
the high real exchange rate of the ruble in the run-up to the crisis. 
                                                 
Real output, capacity utilization and profits of our firm, which had been at a 
trough in 1998, recovered slightly in 1999 and then took off after the year 2000, as 
demonstrated in Figure 1, which shows both the profitability of our firm and the 
profitability of the sector. Further confirmation of the financial viability of the firm 
can be inferred from the absence of wage arrears in the years 1997 to 2002, a 
commonly-observed feature of the Russian labor market at this time (Lehmann, 
Wadsworth, and Acquisti 1999; Earle and Sabirianova 2002).11  
As a consequence of the crisis local labor market conditions worsened 
considerably, manifested by a fall in the real average wage and a rise in the 
unemployment rate in the local labor market (see Figure 2), pointing to a deterioration 
of workers’ outside options. This deterioration is also captured by falling separation 
and hiring rates in the firm after the crisis year 1998. Table 2a shows that turnover 
rates for all employee categories, calculated as the sum of hires and separations during 
a given year normalized by the stock at the beginning of the year, were high in 1997 
and 1998 and fell quite dramatically after the crisis. Turnover was especially turbulent 
for accountants, production workers and service staff and much more modest for 
engineering staff throughout the period. The total separation rate fell from roughly 
13.5 percent in 1998 to about 6 percent in 2002.  The fact that the bulk of separations 
(about 80 percent) are coded as voluntary quits in our personnel data suggests that 
many employees refrained from quitting in the aftermath of the crisis.12  
11 The available data on wage arrears tell us that wage arrears accumulated in this firm between 1994 
and 1996, i.e. in a period before a constant stream of orders materialized. All the accumulated arrears 
were paid off by the time the crisis hit Russia. 
12 We are, however, aware of the fact that voluntary and involuntary separations are notoriously 
difficult to disentangle. At the same time, Lehmann, Muravyev, Razzolini and Zaiceva (2013) show 
with data from a country-wide supplement to the RLMS data that at least four fifths of annual 
separations in 2003 were voluntary quits. It is unlikely that this fraction was markedly different in 
previous years.  
                                                 
The firm’s employees were thus likely confronted with a more limited array of 
outside options compared with the situation before the crisis. This reduced 
opportunity set was not confined to wage employment as self-employment 
opportunities also became more limited. For example, opportunities arising from the 
“suitcase trade” (the small-scale sale of goods bought abroad and transported by 
individuals for resale domestically) between Russia and China or Turkey nearly 
disappeared due to the large devaluation of the ruble (Eder, Yakovlev, and Çarkoglu 
2003).  
Additional evidence that lends support for the conjecture that workers’ outside 
options worsened during the crisis comes from turnover statistics in a panel of 
approximately 30 industrial firms located in the same city as our firm.13 Table 2b 
reveals that the turnover patterns in this regional sample are similar to those for the 
firm in the years 1998 to 2001. In particular, separation rates fall by similar 
percentages for all employee categories. If we take the turnover rate as an indicator of 
local labor market conditions, we can infer that outside opportunities have diminished 
in a substantial fashion for all employee types compared to the period before the 
crisis. These diminished opportunities can also be seen by the movements of the 
unemployment rate in the given region (oblast). Starting at a substantially lower level 
in the pre-crisis years 1995-1997 vs. the average rate in the Russian Federation, it shot 
up by roughly five percentage points between 1998 and 1999, and then showed a 
cumulative fall of one percentage point over the years 2000-01. Whereas the local 
unemployment rate was roughly six percentage points lower than the Russian average 
in 1998, it was two percentage points higher in 2001. The described trends and 
13 We have available an unbalanced panel of 36 firms (not including the firm that is the subject of this 
study) that represent roughly 15 percent of industrial employment in this region only for these four 
years. A balanced panel of 28 firms is used for the turnover rates reported in the table.   We should also 
stress that official regional labor market data from the Russian Statistical Office (Rossstat) are not 
available before 2005.  
                                                 
relative magnitudes of the unemployment rate as well as the presented turnover 
patterns in a regional sample of industrial firms demonstrate that local labor market 
conditions were significantly worse after the crisis year of 1998 and did not recover as 
rapidly as in the Russian Federation in general.14 
 
4. Theoretical considerations 
Which theoretical set-up can best explain the fall in the real wage and the turnover 
patterns at the firm? Inspection of Figures 1 and 2 leads us to conclude that the 
standard competitive, monopsony and internal labor market models do not readily 
explain either the movements of the firm’s wages or the relative position of these 
wages to average regional wages (a proxy for average regional sector-level wages15).  
The most appropriate standard model is, rather, an efficiency wage model. 
To begin with, our firm pays wages that were far above the average regional 
wage before the crisis; in the aftermath of the crisis the firm’s wage movements do 
not track average regional wage movements (see Figure 2). Both of these facts 
indicate that our firm does not operate in a competitive labor market. Next, one of the 
principal tenets of the internal labor market model is the shielding of incumbent 
workers from external labor market shocks. Consistent with evidence from studies 
using personnel data (e.g., Baker et al. 1994; Wilson 1996, 1999; Dohmen 2004), an 
14 The sample of firms is not necessarily representative in terms of development of total employment in 
the region. However, the estimated inflow and outflow rates are indicative of falling outside 
opportunities after the crisis in our regional labor market. 
15 Unfortunately we do not have a time series for regional wages of the MBMW sector; the regional 
wage comprises all sectors. However, we have data for the sector in 2002, when the average regional 
sector wage is actually slightly lower than the overall average wage. This comes about because in the 
region we have firms in the energy sector that play an important role and that pay far higher wages than 
the average wages in the MBMW sector. The average regional wage can, therefore, be taken as a 
relatively unbiased estimate of the average outside wage that workers of our firm are confronted with.  
                                                 
inspection of the data reveals that the firm never cuts nominal wages.16 But at our 
firm, this does not imply a protective attitude towards incumbent workers as nominal 
rigidity does not bring about real rigidity. In fact, most incumbents experience large 
real wage losses after the crisis, as Figure 3 attests.17 And this occurs in spite of a 
quite stable profit situation of the firm between 1998 and 2001 (see Figure 1). Rather 
than shielding its incumbent workers from outside shocks, the firm’s top management 
seems to take advantage of the above discussed deteriorating local labor market 
conditions when it devises its wage policy. 
Can a static or dynamic monopsonistic model of wage determination explain 
the observed facts? In the setting of a static partial equilibrium monopsony model the 
deterioration of outside options can be modeled with a downward shift and a 
flattening of the upward-sloping labor supply curve facing the firm. With a very 
inelastic marginal revenue product of labor curve18 the resulting comparative statics 
can produce the results that we observe: a large fall in the wage and a slight increase 
in employment. However, the flattening of the upward-sloping labor supply curve can 
also translate into wages approaching the marginal cost of hiring, and thus in this 
model wages may actually rise. The indeterminacy of the predicted movement in 
wages makes the static partial equilibrium monopsony model an inappropriate choice 
of framework. A further reason for not choosing a static monopsony model for our 
analytical framework is that it does not take into account how a firm’s wage policy 
16 The firm’s director general told us that the firm never contemplated to cut nominal wages since such 
cuts might have resulted in even higher quit rates than the ones observed before the crisis. Bewley 
(1999) documents similar motives among managers in U.S. firms. 
17 Clearly, nominal rigidity brings about real rigidity when there is zero or very low inflation (Fehr and 
Goette 2005).  While Baker et al. (1994) and Dohmen (2004) also did not find evidence of  real wage 
rigidity in their analyses of personnel data, it still remained controversial to what extent real wages are 
downward rigid as Card and Hyslop (1997) and Bauer, Bonin, Goette, and Sunde (2007) provide 
evidence for real wage rigidity using administrative micro data on wages. 
18 We cannot estimate the own wage elasticity for our specific firm. However, Konings and Lehmann 
(2002) find an own wage elasticity of -0.16 for a representative sample of manufacturing Russian firms 
in the years 1997 to 1998, pointing to a very inelastic labor demand in international perspective 
(Hamermesh 1993). 
                                                 
can influence the dynamics of employment, i.e., the recruitment and separation of 
workers. To analyze this we would need instead a dynamic monopsony model. 
Do the observed patterns in wages vs. hiring and separation rates point to 
monopsonistic behavior by our firm consistent with a dynamic monopsony model? 
One of the key ingredients of such a model is that firms set wages to determine the 
turnover of workers, whereby it is assumed that separations depend negatively on the 
wage paid and recruits arrive at a rate that is increasing in wages. In a steady state 
when separations are equal to recruitments, such a model implies a long-run 
relationship between employment and wages that can be expressed as the long-run 
elasticity of the labor supply curve facing the firm. 
Following Manning (2003) we can write this long run elasticity (εnw) as  
εnw = εrw – εsw     (1), 
where the first term on the right-hand-side is the elasticity of hiring (recruitment) with 
respect to the wage and the second term is the elasticity of separations with respect to 
the wage. By assumption, the first term is positive, i.e., as wages fall recruitment 
should fall, a co-movement that we observe in our data. In the steady state, the second 
term is assumed to be negative; that is, with a falling wage separations should 
increase. This latter assumption does not hold since we observe falling wages and 
falling separations. 
The pro-cyclical movement of wages and quits is, of course, a well-established 
empirical regularity (Pissarides 1994), so the assumption of an inverse relationship of 
wages and separations might be invalid in times of recession. A large enough positive 
second term in equation (1) then can render the labor supply elasticity to the firm 
negative. But as long as the second term is smaller in absolute value than the first 
term, even with a co-movement of wages and separations we can get an upward 
sloping long-run labor supply curve to the firm. In other words, this co-movement 
does not invalidate a dynamic monopsony set-up per se.  
However, our firm experienced steady demand for its products during the 
period analyzed; thus we cannot really speak of a recessionary event affecting our 
firm. Since the assumption of an inverse relationship of wages and separations, which 
should hold under the circumstances confronted by our firm, is violated by the 
observed data, a dynamic monopsony model is also an inappropriate choice of model 
for the analysis of the wage and employment movements in our firm.  
 Given the large fall of wages and separations and the increase in employment, 
the most plausible theoretical set-up is an efficiency wage model of the shirking type 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) or a turnover variant of the efficiency wage model (e.g., 
Salop 1979; Schlicht 1978), in which wages are set above workers’ outside option to 
keep turnover at low, profit-maximizing levels. The firm we study experienced a 
strong and constant demand for its products starting in the years 1995 and 1996, 
which was rather unusual in the sector at that time. Our firm thus needed to keep and 
attract workers who competently and diligently performed their duties, i.e., who were 
not shirking. In particular, production workers, who account for over 60% of the 
workforce (see Table 1), were important to the firm in this respect. 
In the period before the crisis it is likely that workers had many outside 
options in the local labor market and further afield (e.g., the “suitcase trade”). 
Because workers saw such outside opportunities, separation rates were high in the 
regional labor market as well as in our firm. As in the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
model, these separations can be considered exogenous. In this interpretation, to ensure 
a good performance of the incumbent workers (i.e., to ensure non-shirking) and to 
attract a large flow of competent incoming workers, which could compensate for this 
high level of exogeneously driven separations, the human resource management of the 
firm decided to offer very high wages. Then, in the aftermath of the crisis many 
outside opportunities disappeared, and there was a large rise in the regional 
unemployment rate in 1999-2001 (see Figure 2). Consequently, the firm’s top 
management allowed the erosion of real wages, being confident that the workforce 
would refrain from shirking even at substantially lower real wages. 
That the firm indeed pursued an efficiency wage strategy can also be inferred 
from interview evidence, namely the CEO’s description of the firm’s wage policy 
during the analyzed period:  
 
“Higher than regional wages contributed to retaining and attracting highly qualified 
personnel after difficult crisis years in the beginning of the 1990s, when episodes of 
forced downsizing due to the output decline took place. Later, in 1995-1996, the firm 
started to receive orders, production growth began, and there was a need for qualified 
personnel. Since economic improvement happened all over the country, the only way 
to retain and attract personnel was to pay high wages. After the 1998 crisis, it was 
economically expedient to stabilize wages at the regional and sector level.”19    
 
Slightly modifying Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the non-shirking condition 
(NSC) boundary in our firm can be written as: 
wi= ben+ei+ei(a+bi+r)/qi     (2), 
 where wi is the efficiency wage paid in the firm, ben is the unemployment benefit, ei 
is the average effort in the firm, a is the average outflow rate from unemployment in 
the regional labor market, bi and qi are the separation rate and the probability of being 
19 These sentences are taken from an interview conducted in April 2007. 
                                                 
detected shirking in our firm respectively, while r is the discount rate of workers in 
the regional labor market. Where we retain the subscript i we identify the firm-
specific parameters determining the NSC boundary. Our assumption thus is that the 
wage schedule representing the NSC boundary was unique to this firm.  
Equation (2) shows that the parameters a, bi, and r are positively related, and 
qi inversely related, to the efficiency wage, i.e. to the wage that ensures non-
shirking.20  The inverse of the average outflow rate from unemployment in the 
regional labor market, 1/a, is the average duration of unemployment. The larger is a 
the shorter is this duration, and so the less costly it will be for a worker to shirk. 
Hence when a is large the firm has to offer a high wage to ensure non-shirking. 
Conversely, when a falls the firm can lower the efficiency wage. The same reasoning 
applies to the exogenously-given separation rate bi. When this separation rate is high 
because workers perceive many outside options in the local labor market and beyond 
– as was the case in Russia before the financial crisis of 1998 – shirking is not very 
costly. Consequently the firm has to offer a high wage to ensure non-shirking. When 
separations fall, the firm can adjust downward the efficiency wage.21  
A high discount rate r implies that workers put less weight on the (future) 
costs of shirking, i.e. being fired and passing through a period of unemployment, than 
on the immediate benefits of shirking. Hence the efficiency wage offered by the firm 
is increasing in the rate with which workers discount the future. On the other hand, it 
is decreasing in the probability qi with which workers can be detected shirking. The 
better workers’ performance can be monitored – the higher is qi – the lower the wage 
20 We do not discuss benefits here because they are very low in Russia and, more importantly, because 
they do not change over the period covered by the analysis. Also, the positive relation between effort 
and wage is a given and of little relevance for our discussion. 
21We can also have a high exogenous separation rate because a firm has to lay off many workers. In 
that case it pays for workers to shirk while the job lasts, so the firm has to offer a very high wage to 
make it costly for workers to shirk. However, in the case of our firm the high separation rate comes 
about because of the presence of many outside options.  
                                                 
that guarantees non-shirking. This inverse relationship of qi and the efficiency wage 
implies for our firm that workers whose performance is easily monitored, such as 
service staff, could be paid a wage close to the competitive level, whereas managers, 
accountants and production workers, whose performance is harder to monitor, receive 
a high efficiency wage. 
In the aftermath of the crisis outside opportunities diminished and regional 
unemployment rose substantially. These factors translated into a large fall in 
separations in our firm and the local labor market as well as into lower outflows from 
regional unemployment. Hence the parameters a and bi in equation (2) fall 
substantially. Holding the other parameters constant, the ensuing fall of a and bi then 
shifts the NSC boundary downward. So, at each level of employment the firm can 
elicit a good performance of its workers paying a much lower wage than before the 
crisis. It is able to do this since the cost to workers of shirking has risen substantially. 
Given an unaltered inelastic marginal revenue product of labor curve, this downward 
shift produces the small increase in employment and the large fall in wages that we 
observe in our data. 
 In sum, we can reasonably assume that local labor market conditions are a key 
element in the wage policy of the top management of the firm. The shirking version of 
the efficiency wage model sketched above (or a turnover variant of the efficiency 
wage model that formally has a similar structure as the shirking variant) is, we 
suggest, an appropriate model that can explain the presented empirical evidence. We 
next assess whether the personnel data that we have at our disposal generates 
evidence on wage structure, wage growth, and turnover that is consistent with the 
conjecture that the firm’s top management pursued an efficiency wage strategy.   
 
5. Evidence from personnel data on wages, employment and turnover 
Wage structure 
The personnel data reveal substantial heterogeneity in wages not only for the whole 
workforce but within employee categories.22 Service staff had the lowest mean wages 
in 1997 followed, somewhat surprisingly, by engineers, then production workers and 
accountants. Managers had the highest wages on average. This wage structure tracks 
the ranking of average wages for employee categories in the local labor market, as 
data on average wages for these employment categories in our panel of 30-odd local 
industrial firms reveals. This ranking of employee group-specific average wages in 
the local labor market and in our firm remains largely unchanged throughout the 
observation period.  Consistent with efficiency wage models and with the 
characterization above of the firm’s wage setting, prior to the crisis the firm paid a 
large mark-up on the employee-category-specific average wage in the local labor 
market, and this mark-up fell substantially in the aftermath of the crisis. Thus in 1998, 
the earliest year for which we have data, the wage for production workers at our firm 
was 79% higher than those of production workers in the aforementioned panel of 
local firms; by 2002, this mark-up had fallen to just 20%.  Similarly, managers at our 
firm were paid wages in 1998 that were more than double those obtained by managers 
in the comparator panel; this mark-up had halved to 53% by 2002.23 
OLS estimates from an augmented Mincer wage regression of log wages of all 
employees in 1997, reported in column (1) Table 3, show that the wage differentials 
between employee categories remain statistically significant when controlling for 
22 In the discussion paper version of our paper we also analyze total compensation, which includes 
three types of bonuses. Since these other components of pay comprise only a small share of total 
compensation and since total compensation tracks wage adjustments closely, we only look at wage 
adjustments over time in what follows . 
23 The calculation of mark-ups compares the wage in our firm to the average wage in a balanced panel 
of 26 local industrial firms drawn from the larger unbalanced panel of 36 firms. 
                                                 
human capital differences (as proxied by tenure, age, and level of education). The 
estimated coefficients from the augmented Mincer wage regression in column (1) also 
illustrate that workers with longer tenure and more education receive higher wages.24 
The effect of education on wages, conditional on job categories, is stronger for 
women than for men as a comparison between estimates in columns (2) and (3) 
reveals.  
Women earn significantly less than men, while marital status and the number 
of children does not have a significant impact on wages. In line with the traditional 
division of labor in the family, the estimates suggest a positive impact of children on 
the wages of men and a negative (but not significant) effect on wages of women in 
1997. Marriage, however, does not affect men’s and women’s wages differently.  
The mentioned factors significantly determine the wage structure throughout 
the observation period, but the size of the gender and tenure effects are attenuated 
over time as a comparison to the estimates for the year 2002, reported in columns (4)-
(6) of Table 3 reveals.25  Wage differences between employment categories also 
narrow. The wage gap between the service staff and production workers falls by about 
20 percentage points, and the average wage premium of accountants relative to 
production workers falls by about 25 percentage points. Importantly, average real 
wages fall for all employment categories.  
 
 
24 Quantile regressions (not reported but available upon request) show that the effect of tenure on 
wages is similar across the entire wage distribution in 1997. Furthermore, employees with higher 
education (university graduates) have a positive relative return throughout the distribution, while for 
the other educational groups the highest premia are in the lowest deciles. 
25 The gender wage gap evolves in a similar fashion as can be observed in the Russian economy at 
large based on household survey data in this period (Kazakova 2007). In a companion paper, co-
authored by two of us (Dohmen, Lehmann, and Zaiceva 2008) we study the evolution of the gender 
earnings gap in more detail.  
                                                 
Individual wage mobility 
Even though average real wages fall, not all employees are affected by the 
crisis in the same way as the heterogeneous real wage growth rates in Figure 4 
demonstrate. In order to assess whether particular characteristics systematically 
determine wage growth, we regress the growth rate of real wages between 1997 and 
2002 on various individual characteristics and job characteristics. We restrict the 
sample to full-time employees on a full-week schedule.  
We calculate wage growth over the five-year interval only for those who were 
continuously employed during the entire observation period. In order to control for 
selection effects that would bias our estimates of the determinants of wage growth if 
unobserved factors that influence workers’ decisions to remain in the firm are 
correlated with unobserved determinants of wage growth, we estimate Heckman-type 
(“Tobit II”) sample selection models. We perform these regressions for the whole 
sample and also separately for men and women since the determinants of wage levels 
and of wage growth have been found to have a different impact when estimating 
female and male earnings separately (see, e.g., Blau and Kahn 1996, 2006).  
We use indicator variables for having one child and for having more than one 
child as our exclusion restrictions in the estimation of the sample selection model, 
assuming that the numbers of children determine a worker’s probability to stay with 
the firm throughout the period 1997-2002, but do not affect wage growth.26 In 
addition, the selection equation allows for more flexibility in the tenure and age 
(experience) effects since we define detailed step functions with these two variables 
26 These exclusion restrictions can be justified on the ground that in the discussion paper version of our 
study the sample-selection wage growth regressions included dummies capturing the number of 
children and that the estimated coefficients on these dummies turned out to be insignificant. In 
addition, the coefficients on the children dummies in the wage regressions for the whole sample are 
neither significant in 1997 nor in 2002 (see Table 3). 
                                                 
while in the wage growth regressions tenure and age are specified as cubic 
polynomials. 
The coefficient estimates of the tenure and age dummies of the selection 
equations are reported in Table A1 of the appendix for the whole sample (column (1)) 
and for men (column (2)) and women (column (3)) separately. Relative to workers in 
the reference category, who are in their 10th year of employment at the firm, all 
workers except those with more than 30 years of tenure have a lower likelihood of 
staying with the firm. Marginal effects estimates reveal that these negative effects are 
rather similar for men and women at virtually all tenure durations. The probability of 
staying with the firm is increasing up to the age of 50. The very young and those 50 
years of age and older have far lower probabilities of staying than workers between 30 
and 34 years of age. The age effects are somewhat more pronounced for women as 
marginal effects estimates reveal.  Workers with professional education have a lower 
likelihood of staying with the firm than those who have only primary education or 
less. Women have higher separation rates than men. Male employees who find 
themselves in the lowest and the highest deciles of the employment category-specific 
wage distribution in 1997 tend to have left the firm more readily than employees in 
the 5th decile female employees.  
The estimated correlation ρ between the unobservable characteristics in the 
selection equation and in the wage growth equation is negative and significant for 
men, but not for women (see columns (4) and (6) of Table 4). This indicates that men 
whose unobserved characteristics make them more likely to separate from the firm, 
would enjoy higher wage growth at the firm compared to other incumbent workers. 
This finding is consistent with the efficiency wage model, as the non-shirking 
condition entails a higher wage for workers with more attractive outside options. 
The wage growth estimates presented in Table 4 reveal that, conditional on the 
position in the employee category-specific wage distribution in 1997, neither tenure 
nor experience (age) have any explanatory power. Having completed basic or 
secondary professional education is associated with higher wage growth for male 
employees relative to the employees in the reference category who have primary 
education or less. Turning to the employee categories, service staff and engineers 
enjoy higher wage growth than production workers. Accountants and managers, in 
turn, have substantially lower wage growth than production workers. 
Having controlled for job and demographic characteristics as well as for 
employee categories, we find the location in the firm’s employee-specific wage 
distribution in 1997 is the most important determinant of wage growth. Workers who 
found themselves below the median decile in 1997 experienced positive wage growth, 
which is particularly strong for workers in the first decile and monotonically declining 
as we go up in the wage distribution. Above the median of the wage growth 
distribution, wage growth becomes negative; this penalty rises in absolute value as we 
go from the sixth to the tenth decile. This pattern is unlikely to be completely 
explained by regression to the mean. As the correlation in log wages of the years 1997 
and 2002 is high (0.82), the scope for the regression to the mean in log wages is 
limited. Furthermore, we observe a compression of the wage distribution, which is 
driven predominantly by a reduction of real wages in the upper part of the distribution 
(see Figure 3).27  
This wage movement is consistent with an efficiency wage model if the 
outside option of workers at the higher end of the skill-wage spectrum has been 
falling disproportionally: In fact, local labor market opportunities seem to have 
27 The implication of these wage trends is a dramatic fall in the inequality of earnings, which we have 
documented in a companion paper with declining Gini coefficients and falling general entropy indices 
(Dohmen, Lehmann, and Schaffer 2009). 
                                                 
worsened substantially after the crisis year of 1998. While there was substantial scope 
for a downward shift of the non-shirking condition boundary for the highly skilled, for 
the low skilled this scope was very limited.   
 
Employment and Turnover 
An inspection of tables 2 and 3 indicates already that wage and turnover 
dynamics at the firm are consistent with efficiency wage models, as mark-ups on 
average wages paid by competitors in the region are related to turnover rates, such 
that the firm seems to react to a decline in turnover by reducing the mark-up. 
Turnover variants of the efficiency wage model predict that the firm offers high 
wages in times of large and exogenously caused labor turnover in order to attract a 
competent pool of workers. We would conjecture that the firm lowers wages when the 
rate of quitting falls, as lower quit rates reduce the need to hire new workers in order 
to ensure a constant production level. At the same time, this conjecture implies that 
the large hiring that occurs before the crisis is replacement hiring, that is, if the firm 
reacts to quitting of workers by maintaining exceptionally high recruitment levels. To 
see whether we deal with replacement hiring we analyze the pattern of correlations 
between contemporaneous and lagged outflow and inflow rates. The correlation 
between inflow in a particular month and the outflow in the previous month is 
strongest. In an ARIMA model, in which contemporaneous inflow is regressed on 
contemporaneous outflow and two lags of inflow and outflow, contemporaneous 
outflow is insignificant whereas lagged outflow is highly significant (p-value<0.001) 
and the second lag of outflow is marginally significant (p-value=0.1), while lagged 
values of inflow are not significantly related to contemporaneous inflow. The 
conjecture that separations trigger hiring is corroborated by the fact that 
contemporaneous and lagged inflow of employees is not significantly related to 
contemporaneous outflow in an ARIMA model. VAR models whose final 
specifications include two lags of inflow and outflow28 indicate that outflow Granger 
causes inflow, but that inflow does not Granger cause outflow.29 Consequently 
turnover is to a large extent the result of replacement hiring, and thus induced by 
quits.  
 In order to see what drives separation rates in our firm, we estimate Cox 
proportional hazard models in which we specify calendar time as the duration variable 
(cf. Dohmen and Pfann 2004) and assume the same baseline hazard for all five 
employee specific categories.30 We employ two specifications, one without and one 
with controls for the position in the employee category specific wage distribution. In 
order to assess whether the determinants of the hazard rate differ during years of high 
turnover (1997-99) and the period of low turnover (2000-02), we also estimate the 
Cox proportional hazard models separately for the two sub-periods (see Table A2). 
 Conditional on the position in the job-category-specific wage distribution, 
tenure plays a minor role as far as separations from the firm are concerned.  
Employees with tenure up to two years and those who have been with the firm 
between 25 and 30 years have significantly lower hazard rates than workers in the 
reference category who are in their 10th year of employment at the firm; otherwise the 
tenure hazard profiles are rather flat. The small effects of tenure on separation are 
28 The results of a Granger causality test depend crucially on two things, the set of variables included in 
the VAR model and the lag structure (see, e.g., Granger and Newbold 1986). The first issue does not 
cause any problems here since we are confined to two variables. To minimize the bias of the test, we 
start out with VAR models of 12th order and test them down thus arriving at 2nd order VAR models.  
29 We can establish Granger causality here and not causality per se, i.e., we find that outflows 
significantly lead inflows and not vice versa.  
30 An extension of these models allows for employee category specific baseline hazards. The estimates 
of such models, available on request, are virtually identical to the estimates of the presented models in 
the time invariant part of the Cox model. Also the estimated secular patterns of the various baseline 
hazards in the extended model are very similar to each other. We, therefore, stick to our simple 
specifications of the Cox model.  
                                                 
consistent with the rather small effects of tenure on wages and wage growth 
documented in Tables 3 and 4.31 Educational attainment only weakly affects the 
separation hazard in the periods of high turnover, while between 2000 and 2002 
employees with only general basic education have  a significantly lower propensity to 
leave the firm than more educated , indicating that external labor market options play 
a role in separation decisions. The very young and those who have reached retirement 
age have a much higher separation rate than those employees who are between 30 and 
35 years of age. The age hazard profiles are also striking insofar as workers over the 
age of 45, but still far from retirement, have a substantially lower propensity to 
separate from the firm than other age groups. In both periods, engineers have the 
lowest separation rates, conditional on the other controls reported in Table A2, which 
might reflect relatively high levels of firm-specific skills. Consistent with the 
efficiency wage model, the difference in wages between engineers and production 
workers becomes smaller when their separation rates become more similar. Female 
employees have higher separation rates than their male counterparts, especially in the 
period of high labor turnover. In line with the efficiency wage model, the gender 
difference in separation rates becomes smaller when the gender wage gap shrinks. 
Employees with below median wages in the job-category-specific wage distribution 
are more likely to separate than their colleagues at the median, as the efficiency wage 
model predicts. When turnover is high, hazard rates are highest for those employees 
located in the polar deciles, while in the second period only persons in the lowest 
decile have a higher propensity to leave. Consistent with turnover variants of the 
efficiency wage model, we have seen that real wages for these workers fall least.  
31 It is also noteworthy that differences in tenure effects  between the two sub-periods are consistent 
with changes in the wage structure as implied by an efficiency wage model. The estimates of the wage 
structure in 1997 and 2002 reported in Table 3 indicate that the tenure profile at the beginning of the 
career becomes flatter, which is in line with the finding that among employees with less than 10 years 
of tenure those with longer tenure become relatively less likely to separate in the second sub-period. 
                                                 
6. Conclusions 
We have traced out the evolution of wages, employment and worker turnover using a 
rich personnel data set of one Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002. The observed 
evolution points to “price” rather than “quantity” adjustment within the firm during 
the following the financial crisis of 1998, as employment slightly increased but real 
wages fell substantially.  
Real wages had not recovered to pre-crisis levels by 2002, even though the 
firm’s financial situation was then better than before the crisis. Wage growth 
regressions spanning the years 1997 to 2002 show disproportionate wage growth for 
those employees located in the lowest four deciles of the employee category-specific 
wage distribution in 1997 while employees positioned in the highest four deciles were 
confronted with wage losses relative to their colleagues around the median of the 
employee category-specific wage distribution. Relative to production workers, service 
staff and engineers had wage gains over the period, while accountants experienced 
relative wage losses. We can interpret these relative wage losses of high wage earners 
as an indication that the outside options of these workers worsened disproportionally. 
Such asymmetric changes in the outside options of different employment categories 
are plausible when those who are in low-skilled jobs that require little education and 
job-specific knowledge were always earning wages close to the unskilled competitive 
wage or the level of social security, so that the scope for wages to fall even further 
during the crisis was limited for these types of workers. 
The financial crisis lead to a fall in local labor market conditions, marked by 
dramatically falling job flows after 1999 and rising regional unemployment, which  
allowed our firm to reduce real wages without risking higher turnover. In fact, the size 
of the work force did not shrink despite substantial real wage cuts. A simple shirking 
model of wage determination or a turnover variant of the efficiency wage model 
captures the effect of declining outside opportunities for the firm’s workers well: 
Given these reduced outside options, the costs of quitting or losing one’s job rose 
substantially after the onset of the crisis. Firm management could thus lower the non-
shirking contract boundary, i.e. it could offer lower real wages and still ensure a good 
performance of incumbent workers in production without risking higher turnover. At 
the bottom end of the firm’s wage distribution, the firm seemed to pay a wage close to 
the opportunity cost for employees at that end of the distribution throughout the 
reported period. Most of the workers in this part of the distribution are low-skilled 
service staff who are not central to the production process in the firm. As a result, the 
mark up on the competitive wage that a firm using efficiency wages has to pay to 
meet the non-shirking condition is likely to be small. At the same time, paying 
efficiency wages for these workers might even be less relevant as monitoring costs for 
this employment category are likely to be low. At any rate, we take this differential 
treatment of employee groups within the firm as evidence that local labor market 
forces strongly influence the wage policies of our firm, which broadly seem consistent 
with an efficiency wage model. 
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Notes: The figure shows the percentage of profits relative to sales for the firm and the average 
percentage of profits to sales for the machine building and metal working sector.  
Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 2 
Real monthly wage / Regional unemployment rate
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Notes: The figure shows average real monthly wages in thousands of 1997 rubles for the firm and for 
the region in which the firm is located, and the unemployment rate in the region. 
Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of basic real monthly wage in thousands of 
rubles - all employees
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Source: Personnel records of the firm, CPI deflator from Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4 
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Notes: The figure plots the smoothed density functions of the distribution of real wage growth between 
1997 and 2002 for the all employees who stayed with the firm during the entire period. Wages were 
deflated using the national CPI. Wage growth is calculated as the percentage change in real wages 
relative to the real wage in 1997. The density function is estimated using a Gaussian kernel. The 
bandwidth is chosen to minimize the mean integrated squared error under the assumption that the data 
are Gaussian. In the graph we have cut-off the 0.5 percentiles (amounting to 20 observations) in the 
upper and lower tails for illustrative purposes. The minimum of wage growth in the sample amounts to 
-65.1 percent, while the maximum amounts to 417.7 percent 
 
Source: Personnel records of the firm, CPI deflator from Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
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  Table 1: Composition of Workforce (in %), 1997 to 2002  
         
Year 
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers Total 
Absolute 
number of 
employees 
Average 
real 
monthly 
wage 
1997 4.8 26.7 61.6 2.6 4.2 100 2902 1.357 
1998 4.6 26.0 62.5 2.5 4.4 100 2942 1.428 
1999 4.8 26.6 62.1 2.3 4.2 100 2873 0.984 
2000 5.1 27.1 61.5 2.2 4.1 100 2872 0.995 
2001 5.0 26.3 62.2 2.5 4.0 100 2966 1.048 
2002 5.2 25.7 63.1 2.2 3.9 100 2979 1.082 
Notes: The table shows the composition of the workforce in terms of the five employee categories in 
percentages. We restrict the sample to employees who always worked full-time and on a full-week schedule 
The absolute number of employees who always worked full-time and on full schedule is displayed in the 
rightmost column. Average monthly wage is given in thousands of 1997 constant rubles using an annual 
average CPI. 
Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2a: Hiring and Separation Rates (in %), 1997-2002  
  Service staff   Engineers   
Production 
workers   Accountants   Managers   All Employment 
Year In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total 
1997 13.7 14.2 27.8  7.8 7.8 15.5  16.4 15.2 31.5  19.1 23.5 42.6  10.8 9.9 20.7  13.9 13.2 27.1 
1998 13.3 13.3 26.5  6.3 5.8 12.1  18.0 16.1 34.1  20.0 23.1 43.1  16.1 13.4 29.5  14.7 13.5 28.2 
1999 7.6 5.7 13.3  5.3 4.9 10.3  11.8 11.8 23.7  11.1 14.3 25.4  4.3 4.3 8.7  9.6 9.5 19.1 
2000 9.3 7.4 16.7  6.4 5.7 12.1  10.7 7.6 18.3  8.2 0.0 8.2  3.5 0.0 3.5  9.2 6.7 15.9 
2001 7.8 6.8 14.6  5.7 5.1 10.8  11.5 7.4 19.0  13.6 19.7 33.3  5.0 1.7 6.7  9.6 6.5 16.2 
2002 5.4 3.6 9.0   2.9 3.0 5.9   8.7 7.8 16.5   8.1 9.7 17.7   0.0 0.0 0.0   6.7 6.1 12.8 
 Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations; In=hiring rate; Out=separation rate; Total=turnover rate. 
 
Table 2b: Hiring and Separation and Turnover Rates (in %) in sample of industrial firms in the region - 1998-2001  
  Service staff   Engineers   
Production 
workers   Accountants   Managers   All Employment 
Year In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total   In Out Total 
1998 12.4 19.8 32.2  12.5 14.2 26.8  11.7 12.8 24.5  3.8 3.4 7.2  2.5 5.1 7.6  11.7 13.1 24.8 
1999 16.8 14.9 31.7  9.2 7.5 16.6  13.2 12.6 25.8  4.5 4.1 8.6  4.1 2.6 6.6  11.9 11.0 22.9 
2000 13.2 13.4 26.6  9.1 10.1 19.1  12.1 9.6 21.7  5.0 4.4 9.4  3.1 1.0 4.2  10.9 9.6 20.5 
2001 9.7 8.4 18.1  9.1 5.0 14.1  8.6 6.8 15.5  1.9 1.1 3.0  2.1 1.4 3.5  8.7 6.1 14.8 
Source: authors’ calculations based on a balanced panel of 28 firms; In=hiring rate; Out=separation rate; Total=turnover rate. 
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Table 3: Determinants of wages in 1997 and 2002 
Dependent variable: log(real wage) in 1997 log(real wage) in 2002 
  All employees Men Women All employees Men Women 
Tenure in years 0.028*** 0.023** 0.018 0.008* 0.014** -0.007 
[0.008] [0.009] [0.013] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] 
Tenure square/100 in 
years 
-0.140** -0.098 -0.094 -0.023 -0.068 0.073 
[0.068] [0.081] [0.127] [0.034] [0.043] [0.059] 
Tenure cube/1000 in 
years 
0.026 0.015 0.023 0.004 0.013 -0.013 
[0.016] [0.019] [0.032] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] 
Tenure marginal effect 
at 5 years 
0.016*** 0.015*** 0.010** 0.006*** 0.009*** -0.000 
[0.0028] [0.0035] [0.005] [0.0020] [0.003] [0.003] 
Tenure marginal effect 
at 10 years 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004* 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Age in years 0.027 -0.050 0.160** 0.103*** 0.119*** 0.023 
[0.040] [0.050] [0.071] [0.022] [0.029] [0.037] 
Age squared/100 in 
years 
-0.005 0.197 -0.378* -0.229*** -0.258*** -0.039 
[0.106] [0.133] [0.198] [0.055] [0.071] [0.094] 
Age cube/1000 in years -0.003 -0.020* 0.031* 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.002 
[0.009] [0.011] [0.018] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] 
Age marginal effect at 
25 
0.018*** 0.010* 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.007 
[0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.0030] [0.004] [0.005] 
Age marginal effect at 
40 
0.007*** 0.010*** 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] 
Age marginal effect at 
50 
-0.003 -0.005 0.011 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.009] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
Basic professional 0.030 -0.003 0.102* 0.051*** 0.059** 0.012 
[0.030] [0.036] [0.053] [0.019] [0.025] [0.027] 
Secondary general 0.074** 0.057* 0.073 0.053*** 0.028 0.081*** 
[0.029] [0.033] [0.054] [0.018] [0.023] [0.028] 
Secondary professional 0.091*** 0.015 0.241*** 0.075*** 0.041 0.114*** 
[0.031] [0.037] [0.058] [0.019] [0.026] [0.029] 
Higher incomplete 0.173** 0.109 0.329*** 0.072 0.036 0.122** 
[0.070] [0.095] [0.107] [0.046] [0.069] [0.058] 
Higher 0.117*** 0.046 0.309*** 0.098*** 0.060* 0.167*** 
[0.039] [0.049] [0.067] [0.024] [0.033] [0.033] 
1 if female -0.324*** n.a. n.a. -0.165*** n.a. n.a. 
[0.019]    [0.012]    
1 if single 0.025 0.133 -0.051 -0.035 0.157* -0.023 
[0.071] [0.095] [0.105] [0.039] [0.091] [0.050] 
1 if divorced or 
widowed 
0.007 -0.042 0.077 -0.068*** -0.067** -0.055* 
[0.037] [0.043] [0.066] [0.021] [0.028] [0.030] 
1 if 1 child -0.017 0.084 -0.131 0.017 0.194** 0.048 
[0.054] [0.070] [0.083] [0.034] [0.084] [0.039] 
1 if more than 1 child 0.042 0.142* -0.090 0.026 0.183** 0.081* 
[0.058] [0.074] [0.092] [0.037] [0.086] [0.045] 
Service staff -0.736*** -0.811*** -0.597*** -0.577*** -0.608*** -0.510*** 
[0.041] [0.051] [0.069] [0.024] [0.031] [0.038] 
Engineers -0.072** -0.161*** -0.033 -0.009 -0.059** 0.045* 
[0.030] [0.040] [0.050] [0.019] [0.026] [0.027] 
Accountants 0.397*** -0.072 0.370*** 0.157*** -0.090 0.156*** 
[0.061] [0.318] [0.073] [0.040] [0.215] [0.040] 
Managers 0.650*** 0.606*** 0.852*** 0.685*** 0.644*** 0.836*** 
[0.051] [0.056] [0.119] [0.032] [0.039] [0.057] 
Constant -0.558 0.347 -2.412*** -1.555*** -1.976*** -0.655 
[0.470] [0.608] [0.805] [0.271] [0.370] [0.450] 
Observations 2,899 1,772 1,127 2,974 1,853 1,121 
R-squared 0.339 0.299 0.275 0.429 0.420 0.424 
Notes: OLS estimates. Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.; estimates are based on 
personnel data, sample restricted to full-time workers working on full-week schedule; omitted category is production workers. 
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Table 4: Wage growth regressions – sample selection model  
 
         
Dependent variable: real wage growth over period from 1997 to 2002 [log(real monthly wage 2002)-log(real monthly wage 1997)] 
         
 All employees  Men  Women 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 
Wage 
growth 
equation 
Selection 
equation  
Wage 
growth 
equation 
Selection 
equation  
Wage 
growth 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
                  
Tenure in years 0.002 
for tenure 
coefficients 
of step 
function in  
tenure see 
Appendix 
table 
 0.003 
for tenure 
coefficients 
of step 
function in  
tenure see 
Appendix 
table 
 -0.001 
for tenure 
coefficients 
of step 
function in  
tenure see 
Appendix 
table 
 [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.009] 
Tenure square/100 
in years 
-0.013  -0.029  0.009 
[0.039]  [0.046]  [0.083] 
Tenure cube/1000 in 
years 
0.004  0.007  0.001 
[0.009]  [0.010]  [0.021] 
Tenure marginal 
effect at 5 years 
0.001  0.001  -0.000 
[0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
Tenure marginal 
effect at 10 years 
0.001  -0.000  0.001 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
         
Age in years 0.007 
for age 
coefficients 
of step 
function in 
age see 
Appendix 
table 
 0.021 
for age 
coefficients 
of step 
function in 
age see 
Appendix 
table 
 -0.018 
for age 
coefficients 
of step 
function in 
age see 
Appendix 
table 
 [0.025]  [0.032]  [0.049] 
Age squared/100 in 
years 
-0.028  -0.063  0.042 
[0.069]  [0.086]  [0.137] 
Age cube/1000 in 
years 
0.003  0.006  -0.004 
[0.006]  [0.007]  [0.012] 
Age marginal effect 
at 25 
-0.002  0.001  -0.004 
[0.003]  [0.003]  [0.004] 
Age marginal effect 
at 40 
-0.002*  -0.001  -0.002 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Age marginal effect 
at 50 
-0.000  0.002  -0.004 
[0.002]  [0.002]  [0.006] 
         
Basic professional -0.007 -0.429***  0.007 -0.534***  0.028 -0.231 
 [0.019] [0.088]  [0.024] [0.112]  [0.033] [0.152] 
Secondary general 0.007 0.038  -0.001 -0.001  0.064** 0.015 
 [0.016] [0.084]  [0.018] [0.104]  [0.032] [0.154] 
Secondary 
professional 
0.024 -0.318***  0.028 -0.317***  0.069* -0.226 
[0.019] [0.091]  [0.022] [0.114]  [0.039] [0.167] 
Higher incomplete 0.029 -0.204  0.070 -0.366  0.045 -0.010 
 [0.039] [0.215]  [0.057] [0.319]  [0.060] [0.321] 
Higher  0.035 -0.246**  0.037 -0.252  0.084** -0.122 
 [0.022] [0.115]  [0.028] [0.155]  [0.041] [0.191] 
         
1 if female -0.006 -0.549***  n.a.   n.a.  
 [0.012] [0.060]       
1 if single -0.075** 0.153  -0.058 0.900***  -0.096 -0.294 
 [0.038] [0.216]  [0.047] [0.315]  [0.065] [0.320] 
1 if divorced or 
widowed 
-0.050*** 0.530***  -0.080*** 0.415***  0.002 0.682*** 
[0.018] [0.112]  [0.023] [0.138]  [0.031] [0.200] 
1 if one child  0.681***   1.291***   0.308 
  [0.167]   [0.249]   [0.243] 
1 if more than one 
child 
 0.919***   1.546***   0.417 
 [0.178]   [0.260]   [0.265] 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Service staff 0.159*** 0.568***  0.095*** 0.604***  0.278*** 0.759*** 
 [0.020] [0.113]  [0.026] [0.154]  [0.034] [0.174] 
Engineers 0.098*** 1.071***  0.051* 0.980***  0.142*** 1.294*** 
 [0.020] [0.091]  [0.027] [0.134]  [0.038] [0.146] 
Accountants -0.118*** 0.340**  -0.204 0.539  -0.104** 0.448** 
 [0.037] [0.170]  [0.143] [0.731]  [0.046] [0.204] 
Managers -0.066** 0.527***  -0.092*** 0.400**  -0.016 1.180*** 
 [0.027] [0.156]  [0.032] [0.184]  [0.062] [0.356] 
Position in job-
specific wage decile 
in 1997         
  Decile 1 0.596*** -0.181  0.607*** -0.509***  0.625*** 0.276 
 [0.023] [0.117]  [0.036] [0.175]  [0.034] [0.175] 
  Decile 2 0.308*** -0.057  0.304*** -0.136  0.326*** 0.191 
 [0.023] [0.118]  [0.032] [0.169]  [0.035] [0.180] 
  Decile 3 0.182*** 0.037  0.205*** -0.025  0.184*** 0.248 
 [0.021] [0.110]  [0.029] [0.152]  [0.034] [0.173] 
  Decile 4 0.114*** 0.291**  0.120*** 0.206  0.119*** 0.462** 
 [0.021] [0.114]  [0.026] [0.147]  [0.036] [0.189] 
  Decile 6 -0.039* -0.002  -0.049* 0.115  -0.018 -0.141 
 [0.022] [0.116]  [0.027] [0.152]  [0.039] [0.194] 
  Decile 7 -0.080*** 0.245**  -0.067*** 0.239*  -0.119*** 0.261 
 [0.021] [0.113]  [0.025] [0.145]  [0.037] [0.193] 
  Decile 8 -0.171*** 0.219*  -0.170*** 0.085  -0.162*** 0.472** 
 [0.020] [0.112]  [0.025] [0.137]  [0.039] [0.218] 
  Decile 9 -0.191*** 0.195  -0.188*** 0.024  -0.187*** 0.566** 
 [0.023] [0.130]  [0.028] [0.160]  [0.042] [0.243] 
  Decile 10 -0.256*** -0.167  -0.261*** -0.312**  -0.184*** 0.376 
 [0.023] [0.119]  [0.028] [0.144]  [0.044] [0.243] 
         
Constant -0.235 0.078  -0.393 -0.301  -0.055 -0.449 
 [0.299] [0.220]  [0.380] [0.321]  [0.565] [0.324] 
ρ -0.233**   -0.590***   -0.030  
 [0.114]   [0.175]   [0.149]  
Λ -1.642***   -1.594***   -1.681***  
  [0.021]     [0.041]     [0.029]   
Observations 2976   1796   1180 
Estimates of wage growth regression from Heckman selection model based on personnel data; sample restricted to 
full-time workers working on full-week schedule. ρ is the correlation between the errors in the selection and 
regression equations; Λ=ρσ, where σ is the variance of the error in the regression equation.  Estimation is by 
maximum likelihood. Reference category: Worker with basic education who is married and in 5th decile of job 
specific wage distribution in 1997. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1% 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Coefficients of step function in tenure and age from selection equations reported in Table 4 
 Sample 
 All employees  Men Women 
    
Tenure up to 1 year -0.603*** -0.868*** -0.487*** 
 [0.107] [0.171] [0.147] 
Tenure up to 2 years -0.921*** -1.207*** -0.856*** 
 [0.110] [0.174] [0.150] 
Tenure up to 3 years -0.537*** -0.539*** -0.772*** 
 [0.100] [0.158] [0.145] 
Tenure up to 4 years -1.150*** -1.354*** -0.967*** 
 [0.118] [0.167] [0.194] 
Tenure up to 5years -1.227*** -1.452*** -1.089*** 
 [0.157] [0.207] [0.270] 
Tenure up to 6 years -1.376*** -1.470*** -1.427*** 
 [0.134] [0.177] [0.234] 
Tenure up to 7 years -0.729*** -0.885*** -0.844*** 
 [0.152] [0.198] [0.287] 
Tenure up to 8 years -0.811*** -0.868*** -1.251*** 
 [0.171] [0.230] [0.314] 
Tenure up to 9 years -0.583*** -0.818*** -0.592 
 [0.215] [0.275] [0.410] 
Tenure 10 to 15 years -0.613*** -0.654*** -0.786*** 
 [0.119] [0.180] [0.184] 
Tenure 15 to 20 years -0.678*** -0.641*** -1.081*** 
 [0.128] [0.187] [0.214] 
Tenure 20 to 25 years -0.752*** -0.732*** -1.116*** 
 [0.146] [0.192] [0.271] 
Tenure 25 to 30 years -0.509*** -0.571** -0.465 
 [0.191] [0.240] [0.440] 
Tenure 30 to 35 years 0.302 0.231  
 [0.514] [0.536]  
Tenure more than 35 years -0.403 -0.116  
 [0.541] [0.655]  
Age less than 20 -0.789* -1.363* -0.676 
 [0.406] [0.788] [0.522] 
Age 20 to 25 -0.036 0.053 -0.190 
 [0.106] [0.138] [0.172] 
Age 25 to 30 -0.006 0.226* -0.452*** 
 [0.088] [0.115] [0.149] 
Age 35 to 40 0.234** 0.113 0.386*** 
 [0.092] [0.121] [0.140] 
Age 40 to 45 0.235*** 0.205* 0.360** 
 [0.091] [0.121] [0.140] 
Age 45 to 50 0.455*** 0.413*** 0.526***  
 [0.097] [0.132] [0.144] 
Age 50 to 55 0.342*** 0.104 0.750*** 
 [0.129] [0.172] [0.200] 
Age more than 55 -0.433** -0.396**  
 [0.179] [0.191]  
    
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%; sample restricted to full-time workers 
working on full-week schedule.  Omitted categories are: tenure = 10 years; education = basic general; 30 < age ≤ 35; job category = 
production workers. 
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Table A2: Duration of employment till separation (Cox proportional hazard model) 
Period: 1997-2002 1997-99 2000-02 
  All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women 
Tenure:                   
  ≤ 1 year -0.758*** -0.482** -1.213*** -1.041*** -0.310 -2.156*** 0.028 -0.258 1.367 
[0.186] [0.236] [0.307] [0.240] [0.340] [0.346] [0.294] [0.338] [1.020] 
  > 1 year and ≤ 2 years -0.530*** -0.363 -0.862*** -0.539** 0.033 -1.402*** 0.070 -0.178 1.336 
[0.181] [0.232] [0.300] [0.232] [0.336] [0.322] [0.290] [0.325] [1.021] 
  > 2 years and ≤ 3 years -0.385** -0.257 -0.710** -0.246 0.326 -1.095*** 0.130 -0.124 1.329 
[0.179] [0.227] [0.298] [0.230] [0.332] [0.320] [0.288] [0.320] [1.020] 
  > 3 years and ≤ 4 years -0.299* -0.467** -0.368 -0.003 0.175 -0.555* -0.317 -0.804** 1.129 
[0.179] [0.232] [0.296] [0.228] [0.334] [0.314] [0.297] [0.347] [1.022] 
  > 4 years and ≤ 5 years -0.428** -0.636*** -0.379 -0.319 -0.277 -0.670** -0.341 -0.805** 1.153 
[0.185] [0.239] [0.303] [0.238] [0.349] [0.330] [0.294] [0.337] [1.021] 
  > 5 years and ≤ 6 years -0.079 -0.256 0.003 0.197 0.448 -0.327 -0.344 -1.081*** 1.456 
[0.183] [0.233] [0.304] [0.235] [0.334] [0.337] [0.295] [0.351] [1.019] 
  > 6 years and ≤ 7 years -0.062 -0.134 -0.082 0.274 0.530 -0.215 -0.333 -0.783** 1.317 
[0.190] [0.236] [0.322] [0.245] [0.343] [0.359] [0.298] [0.332] [1.030] 
  > 7 years and ≤ 8 years 0.018 0.154 -0.478 0.403 0.753** -0.203 -0.417 -0.457 -0.085 
[0.196] [0.235] [0.370] [0.249] [0.342] [0.391] [0.318] [0.333] [1.159] 
  > 8 years and ≤ 9 years 0.142 0.242 -0.179 0.262 0.714** -0.549 0.072 -0.242 1.568 
[0.205] [0.247] [0.375] [0.265] [0.356] [0.444] [0.318] [0.348] [1.058] 
  > 10 years and ≤ 15 years -0.223 -0.165 -0.429 -0.269 -0.126 -0.627* -0.180 -0.178 0.131 
[0.190] [0.233] [0.331] [0.243] [0.344] [0.346] [0.306] [0.322] [1.159] 
  > 15 years and ≤ 20 years -0.011 -0.052 -0.010 -0.183 -0.044 -0.401 0.324 0.076 1.487 
[0.198] [0.246] [0.338] [0.252] [0.355] [0.367] [0.324] [0.353] [1.078] 
  > 20 years and ≤ 25 years -0.164 -0.192 -0.252 -0.061 0.186 -0.438 -0.515 -0.752* -0.024 
[0.218] [0.262] [0.411] [0.268] [0.362] [0.433] [0.397] [0.420] [1.428] 
  > 25 years and ≤ 30 years -0.739** -0.792** -1.283* -1.008** -0.656 -2.097** -0.293 -0.742 0.998 
[0.305] [0.344] [0.765] [0.402] [0.480] [1.047] [0.468] [0.505] [1.429] 
  > 30 years -0.523 -0.927** 0.475 -1.083* -1.217 -0.034 -0.037 -0.752 2.217* 
[0.352] [0.419] [0.658] [0.626] [0.786] [1.074] [0.454] [0.512] [1.247] 
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Table A2 (continued) 
Basic professional 0.539*** 0.652*** 0.318** 0.131 0.058 0.198 1.126*** 1.469*** 0.524** 
[0.082] [0.112] [0.126] [0.101] [0.137] [0.151] [0.152] [0.215] [0.232] 
Secondary general 0.176** 0.242** 0.120 -0.010 -0.019 0.051 0.342** 0.480** 0.176 
[0.086] [0.115] [0.135] [0.103] [0.135] [0.162] [0.164] [0.227] [0.252] 
Secondary professional 0.542*** 0.611*** 0.392*** 0.157 0.102 0.105 1.072*** 1.299*** 0.744*** 
[0.087] [0.117] [0.134] [0.107] [0.144] [0.167] [0.156] [0.220] [0.230] 
Higher incomplete 0.401* 0.410 0.265 -0.119 -0.289 -0.015 1.113*** 1.203** 0.866* 
[0.219] [0.328] [0.304] [0.293] [0.465] [0.387] [0.336] [0.504] [0.503] 
Higher 0.414*** 0.613*** 0.201 -0.033 0.160 -0.242 0.976*** 1.112*** 0.828*** 
[0.117] [0.167] [0.170] [0.149] [0.213] [0.218] [0.197] [0.290] [0.280] 
Age:                   
  ≤ 20 years 0.229 -0.081 0.755* 1.509*** 1.383*** 1.847*** -- -- -- 
[0.314] [0.483] [0.421] [0.324] [0.482] [0.452]      
  > 20 years and ≤ 25 years -0.001 0.127 -0.098 0.127 0.261 -0.011 -1.047*** -0.935*** -0.679** 
[0.112] [0.155] [0.166] [0.133] [0.181] [0.200] [0.221] [0.308] [0.335] 
  > 25 years and ≤ 30 years 0.176** 0.175 0.252** 0.039 -0.125 0.325** 0.210 0.463** 0.102 
[0.083] [0.116] [0.119] [0.105] [0.146] [0.151] [0.137] [0.198] [0.196] 
  > 35 years and ≤ 40 years -0.275*** -0.148 -0.439*** -0.118 -0.053 -0.238 -0.514*** -0.094 -0.940*** 
[0.092] [0.128] [0.134] [0.116] [0.167] [0.164] [0.152] [0.205] [0.236] 
  > 40 years and ≤ 50 years -0.363*** -0.211 -0.525*** -0.263** -0.181 -0.358** -0.501*** -0.071 -0.810*** 
[0.095] [0.131] [0.139] [0.121] [0.167] [0.176] [0.153] [0.214] [0.229] 
  > 45 years and ≤ 50 years -0.616*** -0.438*** -0.815*** -0.448*** -0.414** -0.482*** -0.958*** -0.483** -1.436*** 
[0.102] [0.141] [0.148] [0.129] [0.184] [0.182] [0.165] [0.224] [0.252] 
  > 50 years and ≤ 55 years -0.730*** -0.248 -1.481*** -0.651*** -0.343 -1.178*** -0.955*** -0.271 -1.938*** 
[0.122] [0.154] [0.217] [0.181] [0.234] [0.301] [0.170] [0.219] [0.316] 
  > 55 years 0.143 0.160 0.186 0.512*** 0.337 0.902*** -0.392** -0.080 -0.508 
[0.136] [0.175] [0.225] [0.188] [0.239] [0.317] [0.199] [0.263] [0.322] 
Service staff -0.425*** -0.364** -0.581*** -0.556*** -0.567** -0.833*** -0.597*** -0.625** -0.406 
[0.137] [0.183] [0.211] [0.173] [0.232] [0.265] [0.226] [0.300] [0.358] 
Engineers -0.998*** -0.940*** -1.039*** -1.125*** -1.259*** -1.181*** -0.774*** -0.732*** -0.738*** 
[0.092] [0.145] [0.127] [0.121] [0.200] [0.163] [0.140] [0.212] [0.207] 
Accountants -0.194 0.448 -0.168 -0.097 -43.515 -0.061 -0.267 1.402* -0.467 
[0.154] [0.736] [0.170] [0.193] [0.000] [0.212] [0.259] [0.810] [0.296] 
Managers -0.646*** -0.585*** -1.097** -0.169 -0.256 -0.591 -2.614*** -2.349*** -46.602 
[0.195] [0.225] [0.434] [0.213] [0.255] [0.445] [0.720] [0.727] [0.000] 
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Table A2 (continued) 
1 if female 0.592*** n.a.  n.a. 0.561*** n.a. n.a. 0.246** n.a. n.a. 
[0.058]    [0.076]    [0.097]    
1 if single 0.011  -0.579***  0.410* -0.048 -0.384 0.307  0.457* -0.514  1.227*** 
[0.158] [0.216] [0.237] [0.200] [0.269] [0.300] [0.265] [0.359] [0.387] 
1 if divorced or widowed -0.443** 0.176 -0.867*** -0.708*** -0.370 -1.091*** -0.386 0.610 -1.243*** 
[0.193] [0.254] [0.302] [0.267] [0.349] [0.422] [0.299] [0.388] [0.454] 
1 if 1 child -0.429*** -0.960*** 0.027 -0.505*** -0.886*** -0.162 -0.326 -1.216*** 0.563 
[0.128] [0.163] [0.205] [0.157] [0.201] [0.247] [0.226] [0.284] [0.359] 
1 if more than 1 child -0.627*** -1.228*** -0.040 -0.962*** -1.327*** -0.628** -0.104 -1.179*** 1.043*** 
[0.147] [0.187] [0.234] [0.186] [0.236] [0.297] [0.249] [0.314] [0.392] 
Position in job-specific wage 
decile in 1997               
  Decile 1 0.318*** 0.212 0.188 0.444*** 0.879*** 0.041 0.472** -0.041 0.554** 
[0.110] [0.177] [0.146] [0.132] [0.204] [0.177] [0.200] [0.374] [0.271] 
  Decile 2 0.038 0.069 -0.131 -0.009 0.153 -0.259 0.041 -0.210 0.168 
[0.120] [0.184] [0.161] [0.143] [0.222] [0.192] [0.218] [0.332] [0.302] 
  Decile 3 0.122 0.276 -0.115 0.137 0.444** -0.228 -0.027 -0.273 0.150 
[0.119] [0.172] [0.166] [0.141] [0.205] [0.196] [0.225] [0.327] [0.318] 
  Decile 4 -0.004 0.034 -0.085 -0.012 0.061 -0.088 0.108 0.109 0.032 
[0.126] [0.180] [0.177] [0.153] [0.222] [0.213] [0.222] [0.313] [0.319] 
  Decile 6 0.110 0.173 0.039 0.003 0.037 0.035 0.367* 0.419 0.249 
[0.122] [0.168] [0.181] [0.148] [0.212] [0.211] [0.217] [0.280] [0.360] 
  Decile 7 -0.068 0.006 -0.132 0.073 0.208 -0.084 -0.431* -0.383 -0.373 
[0.130] [0.173] [0.203] [0.151] [0.209] [0.227] [0.256] [0.316] [0.475] 
  Decile 8 -0.352** -0.158 -0.699** -0.361** -0.108 -0.574* -0.471* -0.321 -1.168 
[0.143] [0.178] [0.280] [0.167] [0.214] [0.306] [0.280] [0.326] [0.749] 
  Decile 9 0.005 0.208 -0.552* -0.089 0.202 -0.630* 0.084 0.081 -0.231 
[0.137] [0.171] [0.289] [0.170] [0.215] [0.352] [0.235] [0.287] [0.516] 
  Decile 10 0.464*** 0.672*** -0.481 0.455*** 0.777*** -0.566 0.344 0.310 -0.064 
[0.122] [0.154] [0.321] [0.144] [0.189] [0.358] [0.229] [0.275] [0.759] 
Observations 211,924 138,002 73,922 94,167 58,650 35,517 110,425 71,851 38,574 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%; “--” indicates too few observations in cell to obtain estimate; sample restricted to full-time 
workers working on full-week schedule.  Omitted categories are: tenure = 10 years; education = basic general; 30 < age ≤ 35; job category = production workers; wage decile 5 (40-
50%). 
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